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Learning from (Failed) Replications: Cognitive Load Manipulations and Charitable
Giving*
Judd B. Kessler
University of Pennsylvania
Stephan Meier
Columbia University
Abstract:
Replication of empirical studies is much more than a tool to police the field. Failed
replications force us to recognize that seemingly arbitrary design features may impact
results in important ways. We describe a study that used a cognitive load manipulation to
investigate the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving and a set of failed
replications of that study. While the original study showed large and statistically
significant results, we failed to replicate using the same protocol and the same subject
pool. After the first failed replication, we hypothesized that the order our study was taken
in a set of unrelated studies in a laboratory session generated the differences in effects.
Three more replication attempts supported this hypothesis. The study demonstrates the
importance of replication in advancing our understanding of the mechanisms driving a
particular result and it questions the robustness of results established by cognitive load
tests.
Introduction
Replication of empirical studies can help identify false positive results and uncover
questionable research practices (see special section on replicability in Perspectives in
Psychological Science, including Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). But running
replications is about more than policing the field. Replications can elucidate how subtle
differences in setting, subject pool, and protocol impact results. Specifically, failed
replications force us to recognize that some seemingly arbitrary design features may be
necessary for a result to arise, which can help us understand the mechanisms driving the
effect (for a similar argument about laboratory and field experiments see Kessler, 2013).
This paper describes a set of studies in which we use a cognitive load manipulation to
investigate the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving (for a discussion of
mental processes on charitable giving, see Loewenstein and Small (2007)). Our original
results suggested that people gave substantially more money to a charity when placed
under high cognitive load, results that were consistent with other findings in the
literature. Schulz et al. (in press) and Rand et al. (2012) have found similar effects;
however, Hauge et al. (2009) found no impact of load on giving.
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Given our large treatment effect and statistically significant results, we were confident
that our findings had pushed forward the frontiers of knowledge (see manuscript in
SOM). While we were conducting more research, however, we failed to replicate our
original result. We hypothesized that a subtle difference between the original study and
the failed replication attempt — the order our study was taken in an hour-long laboratory
session — generated the difference in effects. Three more replication attempts supported
this hypothesis.
Method
The original study was a 2 (charity request or general request) x 2 (low or high cognitive
load) between-subjects design. The replication attempts kept the same design, but here
we focus only on the charity requests (see SOM for results from all sessions). Each study
was one of several unrelated studies in an hour-long session at the Wharton Behavioral
Lab. Sometimes our study was first in the session and sometimes it followed other
studies. We were initially indifferent about the session order. Subsequently, we explicitly
asked to be at the start of the session or fourth in the session as explained below.
Subjects
We analyze 405 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (53.3% female) who
participated in our charity request condition. Subjects received $10 payment for the hourlong session and whatever amount they chose to keep in our study. Across all studies, the
subject pool and the instructions were kept the same.
Charity Request
Subjects were placed under high or low cognitive load, given an endowment of $3, and
asked how much of their endowment they wanted to donate to the American Red Cross.
Cognitive load manipulation
Cognitive load manipulations often involve memorizing a sequence (e.g., Gilbert et al.,
1995; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Since subjects made numeric
giving decisions, we used a sequence of letters to avoid anchoring effects (Tversky,
1974). Subjects were randomly assigned to memorize a 3-letter sequence (“GXN”) (low
cognitive load), or a 9-letter sequence (“GXNTDPLRW”) (high cognitive load). We did
not incentivize the load manipulation to avoid income effects.
Results
Figure 1 shows donations by cognitive load condition in the original study and in four
replication attempts. In the original study subjects under high load give twice as much
($0.51 vs. $1.12; 102 obs; t-test, t=2.99 p=0.004) and are 50% more likely to give (38%
vs. 58%; 102 obs; pr-test, z=1.97 p=0.048). In Replications 1, 2 and 4 the sign of the
effect is reversed and the effect on average donation is statistically significantly different
from the effect in the original study (p<0.05 for all tests). We only replicate in attempt 3:
under high load probability of donation increases (60% vs. 79%; 101 obs; pr-test z=2.00,
p=0.046) and average donation directionally increases ($1.03 vs. $1.35, t-test, t=1.39
p=0.168).
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Panel A: Average Donation by Treatment and Study
low!load!
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Panel B: Probability of Donation by Treatment and Study
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0.44%

0.60%

0.79%
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0.00%
%
Order%in%Session:%

Original%Study%
n%=%102%
4th%%

Replica=on%1%
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n%=%63%
1st%%

Replica=on%3%
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4th%

Replica=on%4%
n%=%69%
1st%

Fig. 1. Original Study and Four Replication Attempts. Panel A shows average amount of
the $3 endowment donated to the American Red Cross (means ± SEM). Panel B shows
percent of subject who donated a positive amount to the American Red Cross (± SEM).
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Order in Session
After our first failed replication attempt, we hypothesized that the difference in results
was due to the order in the hour-long session our study was conducted. The original study
was run fourth and Replication 1 was run first. Starting with Replication 2, we
specifically asked to be run either first (Replication 2 and Replication 4) or fourth
(Replication 3).
Our data confirms our hypothesis that session order matters. When our study is first in the
session, cognitive load directionally reduces charitable giving ($0.97 vs. $0.78); when it
is later in the session, cognitive load increases charitable giving ($0.78 vs. $1.23; 203
obs; t-test, t=2.84 p=0.005). The effect of load on giving statistically significantly
interacts with session order (405 obs; OLS on average donation p=0.004; OLS on
probability of donation p=0.020). The effect gets stronger when we control for the
calendar date on which a session was run, allowing subjects who participate on different
dates to have different baseline levels of generosity (405 obs; OLS on average donation
p=0.001; OLS on probability of donation p=0.006).
This pattern of results holds when looking only at the three replications conducted after
forming our session-order hypothesis (233 obs; without date controls: OLS on average
donation p=0.053; OLS on probability of donation p=0.024; with date controls: OLS on
average donation p=0.030; OLS on probability of donation p=0.008).
Discussion
What can we learn by comparing an original study to its failed replications? When
another researcher fails to replicate a study, the lack of a result might arise from
differences in methods, subject pool, environment, or some other factor. When a
researcher fails to replicate a result using the same instructions, subject pool, and
laboratory environment, one must look for subtle differences between the replication
attempt and the original study.
Whether our study is first or later in a session affects the sign of the effect of cognitive
load on charitable giving. One possible explanation is that the efficacy of our cognitive
load manipulation is sensitive to session order. For example, the cognitive load task
might more completely occupy the deliberative system if subjects have suffered mental
fatigue from participating in studies earlier in the session. Similarly, subjects might be
differently inclined to spend mental energy remembering the long string of letters in the
high load treatment depending on mental fatigue. Our manipulation check questions
provide some evidence that cognitive load is differently effective early and late in a
session (see SOM4). Another possible explanation is that load is equally effective early
and late in a session but that its effect on giving may be heavily moderated by the context
of the request — even context as subtle as when in a session of studies the subject is
asked to donate.
Both of these possible explanations are worthy of future study. The former explanation
tells a very cautious tale about cognitive load manipulations and suggests further
replication attempts of results established using cognitive load manipulations. Both
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explanations suggest that role of the deliberative system in charitable giving is far from
resolved and that one should be cautious in relying on cognitive load manipulations to
establish that result. A similar debate has arisen about the effectiveness of time-pressure
tests on the role of the deliberative system in charitable giving (Rand et al., 2012;
Tinghog et al., 2013).
A natural next step for future research would be to randomize when in a session a load
manipulation is run (rather than relying on between-session data) to investigate whether
the treatment effect changes monotonically with session order and to investigate whether
the types of other tasks subjects complete in a session moderate the effect of load on
giving.
Overall, these results demonstrate an important value of replication. Even when a
replication fails, it may be able to teach something about the original effect.
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Supplemental Online Material
for
Learning from (Failed) Replications: Cognitive Load Manipulations and Charitable
Giving
In this online appendix, we first present protocols and results from all of our studies
(SOM1).
We then present regression results supporting the claims in the paper focusing on the
charity request to give to the Red Cross, both for all the data and focusing on the period
after we developed our session order hypothesis (SOM2).
In the SOM we also present the following additional results:
Results from the general request, a request to give money back to the experimenter in
some studies or to the Wharton Fund in other studies, and results from the opt-in studies
(SOM3).
Regression results from Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005) questions that
were an attempted manipulation check (SOM4).
Finally we present the instructions for the study (SOM5) and the text of our original
paper (SOM6).
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SOM1. Protocols of all Studies
In all studies participants were…
• Given a string of either 3 (low load) or 9 (high load) letters to memorize.
• Put through the steps listed in the Protocol column
• Asked to recall the letter sequence.
• Asked to indicate which CRT questions they had seen before.
Study

Run
Date
4/10/124/16/12

Session
Order
4th

# of
Ss
205

Opt 1

7/12/127/18/12

3rd

192

Opt 2

9/4/129/5/12
9/6/129/7/12

1st

86

1st

10/25/12-

1st

Original

Rep 1

Rep 2

!

Design

Protocol

2 (load: high vs. low) x 2 (request
type: experimenter vs. Red Cross)
x 2 (request order: charity first vs.
second) with request order as a
within-subject factor. Analysis
ignores the second decision,
treating the experiment as a 2
(load) x 2 (request type) betweensubjects design.
2 (load: high vs. low) x 2 (request
type: experimenter vs. Red Cross)
with request as opt in to donate
and donation request made once
load was removed
Identical to Opt 1

• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to
the Red Cross [experimenter].
• Asked the second CRT question (widget).
• Endowed with an additional $3 and asked if they wanted to
give to the other request.
• Asked the third CRT question (lake).

139

2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 (request
type: Wharton Fund vs. Red
Cross) between subjects design.

194

2 (load: low vs. high) x 3 (request

• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to
the Red Cross [Wharton Fund].
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three
additional new CRT questions.
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).

• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).
• Endowed with $3, given a chance to opt-in to see a request to
give to the Red Cross [experimenter] at the end of the study.
• Asked the remaining two CRT questions.
Identical to Opt 1

8!

10/31/12,
11/5/1211/9/12
Rep 3
Rep 4

!

11/15/1211/21/12
1/22/131/28/13

type: charity forced vs. charity
opt-in vs. experimenter) between
subjects design
4th

202

Identical to Rep 1

1st

206

2 (load: low vs. high) x 3 (request
type: Experimenter vs. Wharton
Fund vs. Red Cross) between
subjects design.

• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to
the Red Cross [experimenter] OR (opt-in) given a chance to
opt-in to see a request to give to the Red Cross.
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three
additional new CRT questions.
Identical to Rep 1
• Asked the first CRT question (bat & ball).
• Endowed with $3 and asked how much they wanted to give to
the Red Cross [Wharton Fund; experimenter].
• Asked the remaining two original CRT questions plus three
additional new CRT questions.
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SOM2. Regression Results of Donation to Red Cross
Donation Decisions to Red Cross by Load and Late in Session
Average Donation
All Red Cross Data

Probability of Donation

Post-Hypothesis Data

All Red Cross Data

Post-Hypothesis Data

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.633
(0.219)***

0.709
(0.217)***

0.589
(0.303)*

0.677
(0.309)**

0.229
(0.098)**

0.273
(0.099)***

0.284
(0.125)**

0.342
(0.128)***

High Load

-0.193
(0.153)

-0.198
(0.155)

-0.270
(0.199)

-0.300
(0.206)

-0.051
(0.071)

-0.067
(0.073)

-0.097
(0.087)

-0.132
(0.091)

Late in Session

-0.188
(0.153)

-0.083
(0.213)

-0.046
(0.070)

0.007
(0.090)

0.974
(0.118)***

1.113
(0.151)***

0.546
(0.051)***

0.597
(0.063)***

High Load*
Late in Session

Constant
Date Dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

405

405

233

233

405

405

233

233

This table reports OLS regression results on the average amount donated and a linear probability model (OLS) of whether the subject
donated a positive amount. Date Dummies include a dummy variable for each calendar date on which the study was run to allow for
different average levels of donation on each date. Post-Hypothesis Data looks only at the Red Cross Charity request for Replications 2,
3, and 4 after we developed our session order hypothesis. Robust standard errors are used for all tests and significance is donated: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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SOM3. Results of all Studies
Session # of
Study Order Ss
Original
4th
205
(1st ask)

Red Cross
Low Load
High Load!
Avg $ % Don
Avg $
% Don

Experimenter
Low Load
High Load!
Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don

$0.51

38.4%

$1.12**

58.0%*

$0.29

Rep 1

1st

139

$0.73

45.7%

$0.66

48.6%

Rep 2
(no opt)

1st

125

$1.02

59.3%

$0.79

44.4%

Rep 3

4th

202

$1.03

60.3%

$1.35

79.1%*

Rep 4

1st

206

$1.19

60.0%

$0.90

55.9%

Red Cross
Low Load
High Load!
% Opt In
% Opt In

$0.52

$0.37

25.5%

33.3%

28.9%

$0.21

$0.29

$0.30

Wharton Fund
Low Load
High Load!
Avg $ % Don Avg $ % Don

19.2%
$0.24

20.0%

$0.22

23.5%

$0.38

37.2%

$0.15*

15.5%*

$0.22

17.2%

$0.25

30.8%

25.0%

25.8%

Experimenter
Low Load
High Load!
% Opt In
% Opt In

Opt 1

3rd

192

50.0%

52.0%

34.0%

54.3%*

Opt 2

1st

86

45.5%

59.1%

40.9%

25.0%

Rep 2
(opt)

1st

67

40.0%

50.0%

This table reports results from each study and indicates whether the high load and low load conditions are statistically significantly
different using t-tests (for average donation) and pr-tests (for probability of donation and probability of opting in): * p<0.05, **
p<0.01.
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SOM4. Cognitive Reflection Tests
Cognitive Reflection Test Questions Answered Correctly by High Load and Late in Session
Subjects Analyzed in this Paper
Bat
(0 or 1)

Bat and Widget
(0 to 2)

All Subjects

Bat, Widget and Lake
(0 to 3)

Bat
(0 or 1)

Bat and Widget
(0 to 2)

Bat, Widget and
Lake (0 to 3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

High Load*
Late in Session

-0.193
(0.099)*

-0.184
(0.102)

-0.409
(0.165)**

-0.425
(0.169)**

-0.481
(0.226)**

-0.505
(0.229)**

-0.056
(0.057)

-0.056
(0.057)

-0.001
(0.065)

-0.097
(0.093)

-0.131
(0.126)

-0.127
(0.126)

High Load

0.116
(0.070)*

0.109
(0.072)

0.202
(0.118)*

0.208
(0.122)*

0.279
(0.161)*

0.295
(0.166)*

0.037
(0.040)

0.036
(0.040)

0.076
(0.066)

-0.002
(0.065)

0.002
(0.088)

0.001
(0.088)

Late in Session

0.108
(0.069)

-0.200
(0.115)*

0.254
(0.158)

0.047
(0.040)

-0.010
(0.093)

0.074
(0.090)

0.474
(0.051)***

0.845
(0.085)***

1.464
(0.115)***

0.503
(0.028)***

0.917
(0.046)***

1.589
(0.062)***

Constant
Date Dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

405

405

405

405

405

405

1224

1224

1224

1224

1224

1224

This table reports OLS regression results on the number of questions answered correctly in the cognitive reflection test for the first
question (Bat), the first two questions (Bat and Widget) and all three questions that were asked to all subjects (Bat, Widget, and Lake).
The first six regressions analyze subjects who answered the Red Cross donation question and are analyzed in this paper. The second
six regressions analyze all subjects who answered Cognitive Reflection Test questions in any of the studies listed in SOM 1. Robust
standard errors are used for all tests and significance is donated: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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SOM5. Instructions shown to Participants
(i) Introduction and Cognitive Load Screen
In this study, you are going to memorize a sequence of letters and answer several
questions.
People are often busy or distracted while trying to remember things in the real world. We
are going to have you make a series of judgments and decisions while you try to
remember a sequence of letters.
Below is a sequence of three letters to memorize and keep in your mind throughout this
study. You will be asked to recall this sequence at the end of the study.
Letter Sequence:
[low load condition] G X N [high load condition] G X N T D P L R W
Take a moment to memorize these letters. When you are ready to continue, click the
“Next'' button.
(ii) Request Screen
We have given you an additional $3 for participating in this study. As of now, this money
is yours and you may use it however you like.
If you’d like, you may choose to donate a portion of your $3 endowment to the American
Red Cross [return a portion of your $3 endowment to the experimenter for use in future
studies]. You can donate [return] any amount, including $0.00, in increments of 25 cents.
How much would you like to donate to the American Red Cross [return to the
experimenter]?
$ _________

!
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SOM6. Original Study
Deliberative Reasoning Constrains Charitable Giving
Humans are willing to incur a cost to help others, including genetically unrelated
strangers, as evidenced by widespread charitable giving (Andreoni, 2006; Gneezy,
Gneezy, Nelson, & Brown, 2010). A crucial question about the nature of human
generosity is whether people are innately selfish but capable of generosity or innately
charitable but capable of selfishness. We investigate this question by considering the role
of the deliberative system — characterized by careful analytic reasoning — in
anonymous charitable giving.
Within the dual processes framework of decision making (Kahneman, 2003; Sanfey,
Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006; Sloman, 1996), one hypothesis is that people are
innately selfish (Dawkins, 1989; Moore & Loewenstein, 2004) and the deliberative
system must determine whether a situation is worthy of personal sacrifice before an
individual will engage in charitable behavior. An alternative hypothesis is that people are
inherently altruistic (Bowles, 2006; de Waal, 2008) and the deliberative system must
inhibit charitable impulses in order to prioritize personal welfare. These two hypotheses
paint very different pictures of the human generosity and the extent to which we are
programmed to be generous.
We experimentally test the importance of the deliberative system in the non-strategic
setting of anonymous charitable giving by occupying cognitive resources crucial to
deliberative processing with a working memory task (Baddeley, 1992; Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989; Miller, 1956).1 Charitable giving more than doubles when we impinge
the deliberative system by placing subjects under high cognitive load. The effect of load
on giving is specific to charitable donation; cognitive load does not affect giving to a
general (i.e. non-charitable) request. Our findings suggest that humans are instinctively
generous and that deliberative reasoning constrains charitable giving.
Method
This study was a 2 (charity request or general request) x 2 (low or high cognitive load)
between-subjects design.
Subjects
Subjects were 205 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates (mean age=20, SD=1.5;
63% female) who participated in this study as the first of several unrelated studies in an
hour-long session at the Wharton Behavioral Lab. Subjects received $10 payment for the
entire session and whatever they chose to keep in this study.
Charity Request vs. General Request
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Prior research based on disrupting the right dorsolateral prefontal cortex can be interpreted as showing the
importance of the deliberate system in strategic interactions (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, &
Fehr, 2006).
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While subjects were under high or low cognitive load, they were given an endowment of
$3 and exposed to a request. Half of the subjects (n=102) were asked how much they
wanted to give to the American Red Cross (“Charity Request''). The other half (n=103)
were asked how much they wanted to give to the experimenter for use in future studies
(“General Request''). Subjects could give up to their $3 endowment in increments of
$0.25. The amount given in response to either request was deducted from the subject’s
earnings.
The variation in the type of request allows us to determine whether occupying the
deliberative system affects giving to charitable requests only, or whether it affects giving
to requests in general (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). If cognitive load only affects
charitable giving, we can make inferences about the human charitable instinct; if it affects
behavior towards both requests, we can only infer the role of the deliberative system in
compliance more generally. In addition, the general request has the same structure as the
charitable request, so it acts as a control for other effects cognitive load might have on
behavior. For example, if high cognitive load makes subjects give randomly or give
without reading the question carefully, we should observe those behaviors in response to
both requests.
Cognitive load manipulation
Cognitive load manipulations often involve asking participants to memorize a sequence
(Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).
Since subjects in our experiment were making numeric giving decisions, we asked
subjects to memorize a sequence of letters — rather than numbers — to avoid anchoring
effects (Tversky, 1974). Subjects were randomly assigned to memorize either a 3-letter
sequence (“GXN'') (low cognitive load, n=103), or a 9-letter sequence
(“GXNTDPLRW'') (high cognitive load n=102). We did not incentivize the cognitive
load manipulation to avoid income effects.
Results
Figure 1 shows that giving to charity more than doubles when we occupy participants'
deliberative systems by placing them under high cognitive load (t-test, t=2.986 p=0.004,
see SOM for robustness tests). Individuals under high cognitive load are not only more
likely to give nonzero amounts (t=1.993 p=0.049), but they also make larger donations
conditional on giving (n=49, t=2.289 p=0.027). Furthermore, individuals under high
cognitive load are significantly more likely to give their entire endowment to charity
(t=2.663 p=0.009). These results suggest that individuals are inclined to give to charity
when asked and require cognitive resources to withhold donations.
Importantly, the effect of cognitive load is unique to the charity request. Individuals
under high cognitive load do not give more to a general request than individuals under
low cognitive load (t-test, t=0.773 p=0.441); in fact, they give directionally less.
Occupying the deliberative system does not lead individuals to comply with requests
more generally; rather, the effect of occupying the deliberative system is specific to
charitable giving.
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Discussion
Occupying the deliberative system with cognitive load increases donation to the
American Red Cross, a charitable request, but does not affect the amount of money
returned to the experimenter. That cognitive load does not increase giving back to the
experimenter demonstrates that the effect of occupying the deliberative system is specific
to charitable request and that cognitive load is not generating an increase in giving as a
result of random actions or subjects failing to read the question carefully.
That the average charitable donation more than doubles when subjects are put under high
cognitive load is consistent with the interpretation that generosity is somewhat automatic
or instinctual and that cognitive resources are needed for individuals to inhibit charitable
impulses and act selfishly. The results inform theories about the origin of human
generosity and has practical implication for charitable fundraising.
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Fig. 1. Average percentage of the $3 endowment given to either the American Red Cross
(“Charity Request'') or to the experimenter (“General Request'') (means ± SEM).
Participants were independently randomized across the Charity Request or General
Request and across being put under high or low cognitive load.
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